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Commodity market risk from 1995
to 2013: an extreme value theory
approach
Torun Fretheim and Glenn Kristiansen*
5 NMBU School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences©, NO-1432 Ås, Norway
In this©article we examine whether extreme risk has increased in the
agricultural commodity market during the period 1995©–2013. We add to
the literature on food price volatility by analysing the tail segment of
10 futures price return distributions. Food price variability is a concern for
governments and regulators worldwide, as most nations trade in food.
High food price variability can contribute to poverty and malnourishment,
in particular for people in less economically developed economies. We
ﬁnd no indications of systematically increasing tail-risk for the commod-
15 ities in our sample. Analysis of estimated shape-parameters of the
Generalized Extreme Value distribution further supports the conclusion
that there is no general systematic change in the extreme risk associated
with these commodity investments.
Keywords: tail risk; extreme value theory; generalized extreme value
20 distribution; bootstrapping; agricultural commodities
JEL Classiﬁcation: G1; G13; G15; Q110
I. Introduction
This study is a contribution to the debate on whether
commodity prices have become more volatile during
25 recent years. The previous decade has been charac-
terized by signiﬁcant turbulence in ﬁnancial markets
worldwide, and a lot of attention has been focused on
commodities and the adverse effects of increasing
food prices. The price volatility of agricultural com-
30 modities is a topic that has been under less scrutiny,
and the majority of analyses have focused on tradi-
tional volatility measures such as variance and SD©.
Measuring dispersion around the mean can give a
good gauge of movements around a trend or a central
35tendency, but fails to capture the risk associated with
the extreme events that manifest themselves as out-
liers. Our contribution in this respect is an analysis of
the tail risk related to commodity investments.
After more than 20 years of stagnant prices, agri-
40cultural commodity prices started to increase
rapidly in 2006, peaking in July 2008. Soon there-
after prices plummeted, and remained low through-
out the ﬁnancial crisis before recovering in the
second half of 2009 (see Fig. 1). By April 2011,
45prices were again approaching the levels preceding
2008. Both academics and regulators have been
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trying to identify the driving forces behind this
upsurge in commodity prices.
Food price volatility will affect virtually all
50 economies across the globe, as most nations trade
in food (Gilbert and Morgan, 2010). The impact is
determined by whether the country is a net importer
or exporter of agricultural commodities, and to what
degree it is integrated into world markets. Industrial
55 countries are less exposed to volatility risk at the
micro level, as households in more economically
developed nations spend a lesser proportion of
their disposable income on food. Moreover, produ-
cers in richer nations have more tools available to
60 accommodate volatility risk, such as futures hed-
ging in commodity markets or crop insurance.
Developing countries are clearly more vulnerable
to food price volatility because their trade bill is
often heavily dependent on primary commodities.
65 The net welfare effects hinge on whether the coun-
try is a net importer of food, or whether agricultural
commodities are a source for export earnings. For
instance, volatility in world soybean prices during
the period 2007©–2009 contributed to increased pov-
70 erty in Indonesia, being a net importer of this com-
modity (Dartanto and Usman, 2011). People in
poorer countries generally spend a large portion of
the household income on food, and there are often
few alternatives for staple food items (Gilbert and
75 Morgan, 2010).
In this©article we expand the existing body of
literature on commodity price volatility by examin-
ing extreme price deviations, as opposed to devia-
tions deﬁned in terms of the normal distribution. This
80topic should be of both academic and practical inter-
est as price variability inﬂuences a variety of ﬁnan-
cial decisions such as asset allocation, risk transfer
and derivative pricing. It is well established that
commodity price returns exhibit high peaks and
85excess kurtosis (Geman, 2005), which means that
extreme deviations from the mean are more likely
than what models and risk metrics based on the
normal distribution imply.
Extreme events have been widely discussed in the
90aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis. Some argue that not
only are such events much more common than pre-
dicted by modern ﬁnancial theory, the consequences
of extreme market moves are also largely underesti-
mated. A problem with many tools in ﬁnance is that
95they attempt to capture the entire density of a dis-
tribution typically using SD©, skewness and kurtosis.
In practice, this means that we get a good description
of the mean and central area where we have an
abundance of data, but this approach fails in the
100tails where we have very few observations to go on.
For these reasons, we choose to focus solely on the
tail behaviour of commodity price returns in order to
provide more information on price volatility in these
markets, and whether price volatility changes during
105the period 1995©–2013. Our theoretical approach is
the extreme value theory (EVT), which has the
advantage of utili©zing the beneﬁt of asymptotic
results that hold for a wide range of parametric dis-
tributions. Further, EVT provides the possibility of
110focusing on the two tails of the distribution sepa-
rately, which is appropriate when faced with skewed
distributions.
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S&P GSCI Agriculture Spot Price Index
Fig. 1. The S&P GSCI agricultural spot price index, daily prices 02.01.95©–31.10.14 (Rebased, 2 January
©1995 = 100)
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In the next section, we discuss the rationale and
theoretical foundation for this©article. Section III
115 presents data and descriptive statistics for©nine agri-
cultural commodities, observed daily from January
1995 through December 2013. In Section IV, we
outline a methodological framework for risk assess-
ment based on EVT. Section V gives an overview of
120 our empirical ﬁndings, and Section VI contains con-
cluding remarks.
II. Related Literature
Equities and bonds are valued by discounting
expected future cash ﬂows, and exist for the sole
125 purpose of being investment vehicles. Commodities
are different in that they exist to be consumed, and
not to generate future returns. In that sense, they are
not ﬁnancial assets. A deﬁning feature of commod-
ities as an asset class is that they should not be valued
130 by net present analysis (Greer, 1997; Geman, 2005).
Instead, long©-term commodity prices are determined
by a combination of fundamental factors and the
interaction of supply and demand. In the short run,
price changes are driven by inﬂow of information to
135 the market place, forming expectations and specula-
tion regarding future supply and demand dynamics.
Fundamental factors
Typically, agricultural price booms and periods of
high volatility are caused by shocks to the supply
140 side. Weather events or animal diseases that disturb
the normal pattern of variation that is expected in
agricultural production are examples of such sup-
ply©-side shocks. High and unexpected demand can
also cause high prices and volatility spikes. During
145 the crop year 1972©–1973, Chicago wheat prices
gyrated when the Soviet regime abandoned their
policy of not trading with the capitalist world and
instead bought 30 million metric tons of grain. This
was more than half the commercially exported grain
150 worldwide that season (Kub, 2012). The impact of
supply and demand shocks on price volatility
depends on the corresponding supply and demand
elasticities. While it is difﬁcult to get accurate elas-
ticity estimates, it is generally agreed that commod-
155 ity supply and demand are relatively inelastic,
particularly within a crop season. Farmers cannot
reap what they have not sown, and consumers are
generally slow in terms of changing habitual food
patterns. As previously mentioned, it can also be
160difﬁcult to ﬁnd alternative food staples in less devel-
oped economies.
Another key factor that affects agricultural prices
and volatility is available inventory, worldwide or in
a given region. In contrast to ﬁnancial markets,
165volume risk is as crucial as price risk in commodity
markets, because the quantity produced is not known
with certainty ex ante. The theory of storage applies
to all commodities that can be physically stored, and
was brought forward by scholars like Keynes (1930),
170Working (1927, 1933, 1948, 1949), Kaldor (1939)
and Brennan (1958). The theory makes two main
predictions, where the ﬁrst is that when the quantity
held in inventory is low, spot prices will exceed
futures prices, and spot price volatility will exceed
175futures price volatility. Conversely, when inventories
are abundant, spot prices can become depressed with
respect to futures prices, and volatility will be low.
Both 2007©–2008 and 2010©–2011 were character-
ized by adversely affected crops in several important
180regions for agricultural production (Trostle
et al., 2011). However, Gilbert (2010) argues that
agricultural price booms are better explained by com-
mon factors, rather than market©-speciﬁc factors like
supply shocks. He highlights that demand growth,
185monetary expansion and exchange rate movements
have been central explanatory factors of price move-
ments since 1971. Monetary expansion and deprecia-
tion of the US dollar is also emphasized in Abbott
et al. (2008) as driving the increase in agricultural
190prices. A good overview of macro©economic factors
that likely contributed to the price spike in 2008, is
given in Pies et al. (2013). Here demand for food
increased more rapidly than supply, together with
subsequently declining stocks listed at the forefront.
195Kilian (2009) demonstrates that rapid economic
growth and industrialization in emerging Asia caused
unexpected demand pressure that made energy prices
gyrate around 2007©–2008. Hamilton (2009) con-
cludes that low demand price elasticity and strong
200growth in world demand were contributing factors to
the increase in crude oil prices from 2006 through
2008. Both results are interesting, as a growing lit-
erature suggests that the correlation between energy
and food prices is increasing – see, for instance,
205Gilbert (2010), Dorfman and Karali (2012), and
Tang and Xiong (2012). Some authors attribute the
strengthening of this linkage to the production of
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biofuel using corn as an input. Mitchell (2008)
claims that the increase in biofuel production in the
210 ©United States and the©European Union was respon-
sible for a large part of the build-up in food prices
prior to the 2008 price spike. Rosegrant (2008) pre-
sents a similar conclusion in a testimony for the US
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
215 Governmental Affairs. Likewise, Baffes (2011) dis-
cusses biofuel production, but downplays its role as
a determinant of food prices during the last decade.
His article highlights that biofuels only account for
about 1.5% of the areas allocated to grains and oil-
220 seed crops worldwide, and shows that the correla-
tion between biofuel production volume and maize/
oilseed prices is very low. Nevertheless, the role of
biofuels as a determinant of agricultural commodity
prices and volatility remains controversial.
225 A thorough review of how biofuel policies might
inﬂuence corn price volatility and price levels is given
in Abbott (2013). The author concludes that increas-
ing ethanol production has brought about a large,
persistent and new demand for corn resulting in higher
230 corn prices. He identiﬁes a tighter linkage between
energy and agricultural markets in some periods, but
this effect is not constant. Finally, Abbott identiﬁes
switching regimes in terms of volatility levels, with
short periods of surging volatility. This has led to a
235 misperception of a permanent change in commodity
price volatility levels, when in reality it was the big
moves, especially around 2007©–2008, which formed a
false impression of lasting higher volatility levels.
Baumeister and Kilian (2014) use impulse response
240 analysis to disentangle the channels of transmission
from the real price of oil to raw agricultural product
prices, but ﬁnd no evidence that the change in US
biofuel policies in May 2006 have created a tighter
link between oil and agricultural markets. Their ana-
245 lysis further shows that there is no systematic increase
in food price volatility.
The role of speculation
Another widespread belief is that speculative inﬂu-
ences, especially the growth of long-only index com-
250 modity funds, are driving commodity prices away
from their fundamental levels. The debate on specula-
tion and commodity price (in)stability has a long
history (Jacks, 2007). For almost as long as we have
had modern futures exchanges, a central issue has
255been whether futures trading stabilizes or destabilizes
markets, where, in the latter case, it©undermines the
main reason for having such markets (Tomek and
Gray, 1970; Peck, 1976). In a much debated paper,
Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) claimed some
26020 years ago that commodity prices moved too much
in parallel, indicating that herd behaviour rather than
fundamentals was driving commodity prices.1 This
debate resurfaced during the commodity price boom
in the period 2007©–2008. A number of academic
265papers concluded that ﬁnancial investors and specula-
tors had turned commodities into ﬁnancial assets
de©coupled from the fundamentals in, for instance,
agricultural production. The increasing number of
long-only commodity index trackers and the inﬂux
270of large institutional investors and highly leveraged
hedge funds in the commodity markets were said to
cause excessive price surges (‘bubbles’) and dysfunc-
tional markets. Two well-known papers in this cate-
gory are Singleton (2011) –which found a statistically
275signiﬁcant relationship between oil prices and investor
activities in the market for oil futures2 – and Tang and
Xiong (2012), which found that commodity prices
have become increasingly inter-correlated after 2005
and particularly so for commodities carryingweight in
280the most popular indices for index trackers. The
authors argue that this means commodities have
become ‘ﬁnancialized’.
Irwin and Sanders dispute both the theoretical and
empirical ground that futures market speculation is
285driving physical commodity prices (e.g.© Irwin
et al., 2009; Irwin and Sanders, 2011©, 2012).
Likewise, Stoll and Whaley (2011) conclude that
commodity index ﬂows, whether due to rolling over
existing futures positions or establishing new ones,
290have little impact on futures prices. The authors argue
that owing to the passive and long-only nature of
commodity index investments, these are unlikely
culprits of inﬂated commodity prices. Steen and
Gjølberg (2013) revisit Pindyck©’s herding hypothesis
295applying principal component analysis on a basket of
20 commodities. Examining monthly prices for the
period 1986©–2010, they ﬁnd evidence of increased
co-movements across commodities, and between
1This paper was later criticized for model misspeciﬁcations such as arbitrarily selected variables and failure to account for
conditional heteros©cedasticity©; see, for instance, Deb et al. (1996) and Le Pen and Sévi (2013).2 This article has later been criticized for issues related to the data used in the analysis, as well as the interpretation of the
results©; see, for instance, Fattouh et al. (2012).
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commodities and the stock market after 2004. The
300 authors do, however, show that this result is mainly
driven by the extreme price movements after 2008,
and ﬁnd no strong evidence of ‘ﬁnancialization’, or
contamination from the market activities of ﬁnancial
investors, prior to 2008.
305 There is also a growing body of literature that
addresses the issue of increasing commodity market
volatility. McPhail et al. (2012) study corn futures
traded on the Chicago Board of Trade and use a
structural vector autoregressive model and variance
310 decomposition to analyse corn price volatility. The
authors ﬁnd that second to market©-speciﬁc shocks for
corn, speculation is the most important factor for
explaining corn price variability in the short run.
The other factors considered are global demand,
315 energy prices and fuel policies. After six months,
global demand becomes a more important explana-
tory factor relative to speculation, and after 12
months the inﬂuence of speculation on corn price
volatility becomes negligible compared with the
320 effects of global demand and energy prices.
Algieri (2012) ﬁnds that (excess) speculation
Granger causes changes in volatility for several agri-
cultural commodities, but also notes that whether or
not this ﬁnding is statistically signiﬁcant depends on
325 the selection of time windows. That the lead–lag
dynamics of the two variables varies depending on
the time period under consideration begs the question
of whether or not the relationship is spurious. Tang
and Xiong (2012) identify increasing co-movement
330 in volatility returns for commodities by separating
into yearly sub-periods using a regression©-based
approach. They ﬁnd that commodities that are part
of an index exhibit larger volatility increases relative
to non©index commodities in the years 2004, 2006©–
335 2009©and 2011. They argue that this is evidence that
commodity prices no longer are determined solely by
fundamental factors like supply and demand. The
authors conclude that commodity markets are ‘ﬁnan-
cialized’, i.e.©that commodity prices are affected by
340 the investment behaviour of commodity index
investors.
Several papers are unable to conﬁrm that specula-
tion has caused increasing commodity market vola-
tility. Bastianin et al. (2012) examine energy and
345 agricultural commodity futures markets and ﬁnd
that excess speculation is not relevant in explaining
commodity return variability, with the exception of
crude oil. Sanders and Irwin (2011) analyse the entire
range of agricultural, energy, metal and soft com-
350modity futures prices alongside index trader-position
data. Cross-sectional Fama–McBeth regression tests
reveal little evidence that index trader-positions
inﬂuence commodity market return or volatility.
While most studies of commodity price volatility
355focus on futures markets, Bohl and Stephan (2013)
focus on how index investments might inﬂuence spot
price volatility. Their study of six major agricultural
and energy commodities fails to conﬁrm a relation-
ship between the share of noncommercial traders and
360commodity price variability. A similar conclusion is
reached for futures prices in Bohl et al. (2013). The
authors conclude that ‘with respect to twelve increas-
ingly ﬁnancialized grain, livestock, and soft com-
modities, we do not ﬁnd robust evidence that CITs3
365can be held responsible for making their futures
prices more volatile’ ( AQ1Bohl et al., 2013, p. 15).
A more detailed literature survey of how ﬁnancial
speculation inﬂuences agricultural commodity prices
can be found inWill et al. (2012). They conclude that
370there is little empirical evidence for the point of view
that futures trading was the driving force behind the
price spike in 2008, or that futures trading has caused
increased commodity market volatility. Cheng and
Xiong (2013) review academic studies of speculation
375in commodity markets, including energy and metals.
They investigate how ﬁnancial investors affect com-
modity prices through economic mechanisms, with
emphasis on risk sharing and information discovery.
The authors conclude that the inﬂux of index inves-
380tors©has changed commodity markets through these
channels.
III. Data
Because food price volatility is the main focus of this
article, we have chosen to examine a broad range of
385agricultural commodities, namely corn, wheat, soy-
beans, soya oil, sugar, cocoa, orange juice, lean hogs
and feeder cattle. The data cover front month futures
prices from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange AQ2
(CME) group. The CME group is the largest com-
390modity options and futures exchange in the world,
also providing markets for interest rates, equity
indexes, foreign exchange, weather and real estate,
in addition to a large number of commodities. It
3Commodity index traders.
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forms a trading platform©that includes the Chicago
395 Mercantile Exchange, Chicago Board of Trade,
Kansas City Board of Trade, New York Mercantile
Exchange©and New York Commodity Exchange (see
www.cmegroup.com for more information regarding
markets, product speciﬁcations, etc.). More details
400 about the different contracts and where they are
traded can be found in the Appendix. We choose to
examine prices of nearby futures contracts since this
market is forward looking by construction and
respond rapidly to news and changes in expectations.
405 Our analysis is based on continuous series of front
month futures prices obtained from Datastream. The
data is given as an index, which starts with base 100
representing the ﬁrst price or the nearest contract
month. Daily price returns from the front month
410 contract is applied to the index until the contract
reaches its expiry date. At this point the price returns
from the next contract month is used. As the daily
return from the index is consistent with the contract
month, this effectively adjusts the index for rolling
415 yield making this an excess return index. All return
series are calculated as logs, and augmented Dickey–
Fuller tests conﬁrm that these series are stationary.
In Table 1, we have divided 18 years of daily
observations into time periods of 5 years (the most
420 recent period contains 3 years). The mean level of
returns averages to zero over all periods and across
all commodities, which is why we refrain from
reporting these values here. All return distributions
display moderate amount of skewness, which is nat-
425ural as the commodity sector traditionally consists of
both producers and consumers. As a consequence,
the market is made up of participants that are con-
cerned about both price rises and declines.
There has been a lot of focus on the period from
4302006©onwards in terms of increasing commodity
prices and price volatility. Table 1 shows that the
period 2005©–2009 does indeed exhibit high volatility
levels. This phenomenon is, however, not without
exceptions. The volatility of lean hogs has actually
435decreased compared to the previous time periods.
We see that there is great variation in SDs©and
kurtosis, both across commodities and time periods.
Corn is a commodity with a variety of uses and a
product that is heavily traded on exchanges. We see
440that this commodity had an upsurge in volatility
levels after 2005. For the period 2005©–2010 this
could in part be explained by large price movements
that came with the 2008 price spike and the subse-
quent ﬁnancial crisis, but it is less obvious as to what
445is causing the high volatility levels after 2010.
Increased demand for corn for the production of
biofuel in the©United States, as well as adverse
weather conditions in the US Corn Belt, are possible
culprits. While the risk is increasing in terms of
450volatility, we see no evidence of increasing tail risk.
We see that the return series exhibit fat tails relative to
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Corn Wheat Soybean Soyaoil Sugar Cocoa Orange juice Lean hogs Feeder cattle
1995–2000
St. Dev 0.22 0.25 0.21 0.19 0.29 0.25 0.34 0.26 0.12
Kurtosis 1.99 2.26 3.35 1.95 3.06 3.39 17.08 2.01 1.44
Skewness −0.01 −0.24 −0.12 0.20 −0.18 0.52 1.30 −0.28 0.18
2000–2005
St. Dev. 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.36 0.36 0.26 0.25 0.12
Kurtosis 1.35 1.62 2.29 1.20 6.53 1.45 6.28 0.92 8.25
Skewness 0.26 0.33 −0.20 0.15 −1.10 −0.18 0.32 −0.19 −0.88
2005–2010
St. Dev. 0.34 0.37 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.22 0.13
Kurtosis 1.00 1.25 1.88 2.16 1.97 2.99 4.08 1.31 1.92
Skewness −0.07 −0.08 −0.42 0.02 −0.20 −0.50 0.16 −0.22 −0.21
2010–2013
St. Dev. 0.31 0.34 0.22 0.20 0.35 0.27 0.33 0.17 0.10
Kurtosis 2.33 1.99 1.58 1.18 2.71 1.10 3.37 0.90 1.33
Skewness −0.09 0.06 −0.17 0.06 −0.50 −0.14 −0.37 −0.02 −0.13
NotesAQ16 : *Kurtos©es are reported as excess kurtosis. SDs©are annualized. The number of observations in each period is ≈ 1200,
except in the last period where the number of daily observations is©991.
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the normal distribution, but the amount of excess
kurtosis is moderate.
Like corn, wheat prices have been characterized
455 by increasing volatility levels after 2000 as measured
by SD©. We also see that wheat prices are more vola-
tile than corn prices for all time periods. The latter
phenomenon is puzzling for two reasons. First, we
note that corn exports are dominated by one major
460 player, the©United States.Wheat beneﬁts from having
a number of exporters, and while the©United States is
still the largest, their export competes with those of
Canada, Russia, Ukraine, Argentina and Australia,
among others. Some argue that there should be sub-
465 stantial diversiﬁcation beneﬁts from producing in
different regions, as production shortfall in one
region can be made up by other regions. However,
these data tell another story – wheat prices have been
signiﬁcantly more volatile relative to corn prices
470 since the late 1990s.
The second puzzle relates speciﬁcally to the pre-
mise that speculation might drive commodity prices.
The amount of corn traded on exchanges is much
larger than that of wheat. If it is true that speculation
475 is driving price volatility, one should expect rela-
tively more volatile corn prices. A counterargument
would be that the large number of trades in corn
makes this market more robust against speculative
inﬂuences.
480 Figure 2 displays the evolution of volatility and
kurtosis for corn front month futures contracts from
1995 through 2013. We use rolling window estima-
tion to illustrate how descriptive statistics sometimes
fail to capture all the subtleties of a probability
485distribution. The problematic areas occur when vola-
tility levels are low while kurtosis is high, like we see
around the year-end of 2003 and also in the latter part
of 2013. It is common to associate low volatility
levels with small amounts of risk. However, several
490of the risk models in modern ﬁnance assume a nor-
mal distribution, which implies that these models will
misjudge the probability of observing large price
changes in the presence of heavy tails. When the
return distribution exhibits fat tails, i.e.©when kurtosis
495is high, the estimated SD©severely understates the
true degree of observations far away from the mean.
It follows that thinking solely in terms of normally
distributed returns will seriously underestimate risk
when kurtosis levels are high.
500IV. Method
Tail-related risk is today an integrated part of mod-
ern risk management. The branch of statistics that
deals with probability distributions and extreme
deviations from the mean are generally referred to
505as EVT. In this©article we use a variation of the block
maxima estimation method. This approach consid-
ers the maximum or minimum a variable takes in
sequential periods. Formally, the limit law for the
maxima Mn, where n is the size of the subsample
510(block), is given by the Fisher–Tippett–Gnedenko
theorem (Fisher and Tippett, 1928; Gnedenko,
1943):
Let Xnð Þ be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables. If
there exist norming constants cn > 0 dn 2 R and
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Fig. 2. Corn continuous settlement price – Uc/Bc, rolling window estimates of SD©and excess kurtosis based on
daily log-returns,©2 January©1995 to 31 December©2013
Commodity market risk from 1995 to 2013 7
515 some non©degenerate distribution function H such
that
c1n Mn  dnð Þ!
d
H (1)
then H belongs to one of the three following distribu-
tion functions:
Frechet : Φα xð Þ ¼ 0; x  0exp xα½ ; x > 0

α > 0
Weibull : Ψα xð Þ ¼ exp  xð Þ
α½ ; x  0
1; x > 0

α > 0
Gumbel : Λ xð Þ ¼ exp ex½ ; x 2 R
520 The theorem above is one of the fundamental results
in EVT, and can be thought of as analogous to the
central limit problem in standard probability theory
(Embrechts et al., 1997). The key insight is that the
asymptotic distribution of the maximum values
525 belongs to one of the three distributions, regardless
of the original data. The existence of a sequence of
norming constants is not always guaranteed, though
for virtually any textbook distribution it has been
proven that location and scale parameters are deﬁned
530 (Embrechts et al., 1997; Rocco, 2014AQ3 ). The general-
ized extreme value (GEV) distribution introduced by
Jenkinson (1955) combines these three distributions
into a single function with the following cumulative
distribution function:
H x;k;α; ð Þ ¼ exp  1 k x ð Þ=αf g
1=k
h i
; k  0
exp exp  x ð Þ=αf g½ ; k ¼ 0
(
(2)
535
where k, α and  are the shape, scale and location
parameter, respectively. When k > 0, we have the
Fréchet distribution family with heavy tails. For
k < 0, we get the Weibull distribution with a short
540 tail and ﬁnite right end-point, and for k ¼ 0 the GEV
distribution reduces to the Gumbel that encompasses
several distributions with tails ranging from light to
moderately heavy.
To assess whether the extreme risk proﬁle of agri-
545 cultural commodities has changed systematically
during the period 1995©–2013, we deﬁne the©ﬁrst and
©ninety-ninth percentiles as block minima and max-
ima, respectively. The percentiles are calculated as
medians. Because the tail distributions are highly
550asymmetrical, the mean no longer represents a good
measure of central tendency. As for the block size, we
choose to divide by calendar years to avoid any
seasonal effects. This gives 18 non©overlapping sub-
©samples containing daily log-returns of the succes-
555sive calendar years.
One inherent difﬁculty in assessing tail-related risk
is©the fact that extreme events are, by deﬁnition, rare.
This means that it is challenging to make statistical
inference about changes in extreme risk from one
560period to the next. To make assessment about infer-
ence, we use the bootstrapping technique to estimate
conﬁdence intervals around the annual distributions
of extremes. The bootstrap creates a large number of
datasets from the original data using resampling, and
565then computes all statistical measures from these
datasets (see Efron, 1979, for details). We produce
2000 bootstrapped distributions per year for each
commodity in order to create bias-corrected conﬁ-
dence intervals (Poi, 2004). This correction is found
570to have better asymptotic properties than the normal
approximation (Efron, 1987). In order to avoid inﬂat-
ing Type I error when comparing the actual percen-
tiles and their respective conﬁdence intervals over
multiple years, we employ the strict Bonferroni
575adjustment to the 5% signiﬁcance level by assuming
three comparisons across the time period 1995©–2013
(i.e.©signiﬁcance level/3 = 1.67%, yielding a conﬁ-
dence interval of 100% – 1.67% = 98.33%). The
choice of number of comparisons is arbitrary, but
580informed by the fact that the Bonferroni method is
overcompensating for the risk of Type I error. A
visual comparison of the 2013 percentile (©ninety-
ninth or©ﬁrst) with these conﬁdence intervals over
time sheds light on whether tail©-related risk is chan-
585ging. This visual method is informative since the
reader can choose which time periods are most inter-
esting to compare across.
As a rudimentary robustness check, we calculate
nonparametric conﬁdence intervals for the median
590based on the binominal distribution. Upper and
lower conﬁdence intervals are calculated according
to the following approximation, analogous to
Campbell and Gardner (1988):
CI ¼ nq Z
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
nq 1 qð Þ
p
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595 where n is the sample size and q denotes which
quantile we examine. In our case, q ¼ 1=2, because
we are interested in the median. The value of Z
depends on the conﬁdence level required, and is
given by the standard normal distribution. The
600 non©parametric conﬁdence intervals overlap the
bias©-corrected ones with high proximity, and we
thus refrain from reporting them in the results sec-
tion of this©article.
We also assess the change to the probability-
605 weighted moments estimator for the shape
parameter of the GEV distribution, k^, through the
same subsequent periods of one year. Probability-
weighted moments (PWMs) estimators compare
favourably with estimators obtained by maximum
610 likelihood as shown in Hosking et al. (1985).
By using the method of PWM, we were able to
utilize a simple yet powerful test of whether
the tail belongs to the domain of a Fréchet,
Weibull or Gumbel distribution. If the shape
615 parameter© k^ ¼ 0, the estimator is asymptotically
distributed as N 0; 0:5633=nð Þ. By calculating©
Z ¼ k ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃn=0:5633ð Þp , we could compare this statis-
tic with the critical values of a standard normal
distribution (Hosking et al., 1985). Signiﬁcant
620 positive values of Z imply the rejection of the
null hypothesis in favour of©k^ > 0, while signiﬁ-
cant negative values of Z imply rejection in favour
of©k^ < 0. All estimates were calculated using the
bootstrapping technique.
625V. Results
In this section, we give an overview of our empirical
ﬁndings. Figure 3 displays the evolution of the©ﬁrst
percentile for corn futures contracts from 1995
through 2013. The straight, horizontal line©repre-
630sents the actual percentile value in 2013. Examining
the©ﬁrst percentile, we see that this line for the most
part falls outside the bias-corrected bootstrapped
conﬁdence intervals prior to 2006. This can be inter-
preted as an indication of increased extreme risk
635after 2006, although the evidence is not conclusive.
We note that the large ‘dip’ to the right of the annual
distribution of minima coincides with the onset of
the ﬁnancial crisis. Considering extreme risk to the
upside in Fig. 4, we see a similar pattern with a
640breaking point in 2006. The annual distribution of
maxima suggests that there was a relatively larger
amount of tail risk in the time period 2006©–2012,
with large price deviations. In 2013, extreme risk
reverts©to the post-2006 level.
645In sum, we ﬁnd some indications of corn price
changes being more extreme after 2006, with upside
risk normalizing in 2013. A similar pattern is
detected in the price series for wheat. In Fig. 5, we
see that both extreme outliers, as well as the conﬁ-
650dence intervals around them, are shifting upwards
after 2002. The actual block maxima percentile
value in 2013 falls below the bootstrapped conﬁ-
dence interval on all but three occasions during the
time period we examine. If we consider the funda-
655mentals, we ﬁnd that a large part of the build-up in
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Fig. 3. Corn continuous settlement price – Uc/Bc,©ﬁrst percentile with bootstrap conﬁdence intervals, 1995–2013.
The horizontal dashed line represents the actual percentile value in 2013
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wheat prices prior to the year 2006©–2007 can be
explained by unfavourable weather conditions;
most notably the drought conditions in©Ukraine had
a severe impact on wheat prices in this period.
660 Ukraine also experienced drought and a large reduc-
tion in yields in 2012, which coincided with unfa-
vourable weather conditions in the US Corn Belt. In
other words, adverse weather conditions are a likely
culprit for increasing prices and price variability.
665 The results for corn and wheat are somewhat aty-
pical across the return series we have investigated.
We did not ﬁnd any evidence of increasing tail risk in
the return series for the other commodities. Figure 6
depicts the tail risk proﬁle of soybean futures con-
670 tracts, and as before the straight line crossing the
diagram horizontally represents the actual©ninety-
ninth percentile value in 2013. We see that this
value mainly falls inside the estimated conﬁdence
interval for the entire time period, and there is no
675upward trend in the distribution of annual extremes.
Hence, there is nothing here that suggests that
extreme risk to the upside has increased since the
late 1990s for this commodity. Further, the width of
the conﬁdence band is fairly uniform for the period.
680That we only ﬁnd evidence of increasing extreme
risk in the tail distributions for corn and wheat sug-
gests that the aforementioned weather events, and/or
new and persistent demand for corn as an input in
biofuel production, could be driving the increase in
685tail©-related risk after 2006. Taken together with the
analysis done by Gilbert and Morgan (2010) where
the hypothesis of increased food price volatility is
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contested, this raises doubts regarding the claim that
index tracking and speculation uniformly have gen-
690 erated increased and excessive price volatility.
An analysis of the estimated shape-parameters of
the GEV-distribution further supports the hypothesis
that there is no systematic change in the extreme risk
associated with commodity investments. Block sizes
695of one year should be of sufﬁcient size for the asymp-
totic properties of the Fisher–Tippett–Gnedenko the-
orem to hold, and also provide enough information to
get robust estimates of the distribution parameters.
Table 2 summarizes the parameter estimates for
700the right tail of the distributions of the return series.
We see that most of the tails belong in the Fréchet
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Fig. 6. Soybeans continuous settlement price – Uc/Bs,©ninety-ninth percentile with bootstrap conﬁdence intervals,
1995–2013. The horizontal dashed line represents the actual percentile value in 2013
Table 2. Estimated©k-parameters – right tail
Corn Wheat Soybean Soyaoil Sugar Cocoa Orange juice Lean hogs Feeder cattle
Year
1995 −0.01 0.39 0.30 1.09 0.65 0.76 0.58 0.64 −0.15
1996 −0.08 0.05 0.63 0.23 0.99 −0.41 0.97 1.06 0.74
1997 0.78 −0.20 0.05 0.30 1.22 0.03 0.05 1.05 0.38
1998 0.02 0.59 0.23 1.01 1.23 0.20 −0.16 1.63 1.21
1999 −0.13 −0.16 0.09 0.22 0.40 0.45 −0.62 0.31 0.30
2000 0.10 0.00 −0.41 −0.14 0.60 −0.03 −0.22 −0.16 0.58
2001 0.74 −0.46 0.32 −0.34 0.33 0.05 0.45 0.35 1.12
2002 0.53 −0.30 0.14 0.12 0.52 −0.25 0.21 0.80 2.65
2003 −0.08 −0.42 0.15 0.26 −0.41 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.30
2004 −0.21 0.78 −0.21 0.25 −0.11 0.04 −0.26 −0.09 0.59
2005 0.07 −0.17 0.26 0.02 0.05 0.23 −0.09 −0.19 0.25
2006 0.05 0.64 0.06 −0.47 0.36 0.22 −0.47 −0.36 0.13
2007 0.60 0.35 −0.11 −0.14 −0.01 0.49 0.96 0.12 0.11
2008 0.42 0.29 0.16 0.39 0.42 −0.13 −0.12 0.47 0.08
2009 −0.06 0.27 0.47 0.28 0.35 −0.17 −0.20 0.63 0.08
2010 −0.13 0.35 −0.38 −0.08 0.80 0.34 0.27 0.38 0.10
2011 0.99 0.57 0.22 −0.06 0.05 −0.23 0.34 0.68 0.72
2012 0.81 0.13 0.40 0.52 0.49 0.49 −0.12 0.79 0.08
2013 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.10 0.74 0.48 −0.02 0.16 0.52
Notes: This panel presents bootstrap©-estimated©k-parameters for 10 different commodities. Figures marked in bold indicate
that these estimates are signiﬁcantly different from zero at a 5% level, based on a test on the PWM estimator of©k. Under the
null of k^ ¼ 0, the estimator is asymptotically distributed as N 0; 0:5633ð Þ=nÞ, and the test is performed by comparing the
statistic Z ¼ k ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃn=0:5633ð Þp with the critical values of a standard normal distribution (Hosking et al., 1985). Signiﬁcant
positive values of©Z imply rejection of H0 in favour of k > 0, and signiﬁcant negative values of©Z imply rejection in favour
of k < 0.
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domain, while a few follow the Weibull or Gumbel
distributions. Since the latter two comprise of
lighter-tail distributions (to be speciﬁc, the
705 Gumbel domain features a variety of tail distribu-
tion functions ranging from light to moderately
heavy), we conﬁne our discussion to the Fréchet
domain of attraction. The ﬁrst observation we
make is that all but 10 of these parameters are con-
710 ﬁned within the interval [0,1]. In fact, only 42 out of
the 162 estimated parameters are above 0.5. There is
no form of clustering among these values, and we
see no systematic increase in tail fatness that coin-
cides with increasing commodity prices. On an
715 individual commodity level, we see that the shape-
parameters for sugar, lean hogs and feeder cattle
indicate a large number of dramatic price changes.
However, we ﬁnd no commodity that shows system-
atically increasing tail indexes, which suggests that
720 extreme risk to the upside has not increased during
the time period we examine.
Examining the left side of the distributions in
Table 3, we see that the risk of large deviations to
the downside is much greater than the risk of
725dramatic price increases. The estimated parameters
suggest that the majority of the left tails of commod-
ity return distributions belong to the Fréchet domain.
The bulk of the parameters are estimated to be in the
area of 0.5, and many are as high as 1 indicating very
730heavy tails. But this result merely conﬁrms a well-
known fact about commodity returns, namely that
their distributions are fat-tailed relative to the normal
distribution. It seems not to be any discernible pattern
of increasing commodity market risk in the left tail of
735the distribution, regardless of which individual com-
modity we are looking at. While certain commodity
returns such as lean hogs display distributions with
heavy left tails, this characteristic is uniform across
the entire time period we analyse.
740VI. Concluding Remarks
Our analysis conﬁrms a well-established fact, namely
that the distribution of commodity price returns is fat-
tailed relative to the Gaussian. Beyond this, examin-
ing annual distributions of extremes with their
Table 3. Estimated©k-parameters – left tail
Corn Wheat Soybean Soyaoil Sugar Cocoa Orange juice Lean hogs Feeder cattle
Year
1995 0.99 0.61 0.17 0.11 0.20 0.93 0.46 0.08 −0.10
1996 0.76 0.13 −0.06 0.90 0.71 0.42 0.32 0.10 −0.34
1997 −0.35 0.39 0.70 0.78 0.03 0.36 0.47 −0.15 −0.47
1998 0.65 1.02 0.83 0.96 −0.13 0.58 0.72 −0.07 −0.40
1999 0.60 0.26 0.83 0.49 0.53 −0.07 0.41 0.99 0.52
2000 0.23 0.83 0.17 0.93 0.79 1.08 −0.04 0.47 0.47
2001 −0.08 0.06 0.39 0.07 0.74 0.60 0.64 −0.14 1.12
2002 1.40 0.40 −0.43 0.31 0.93 0.81 0.24 0.26 0.00
2003 0.00 0.65 0.18 0.62 0.24 0.33 0.83 0.34 0.49
2004 0.06 0.44 0.52 0.32 0.34 0.02 −0.33 0.23 −0.13
2005 0.92 0.30 0.63 0.44 −0.23 0.96 0.54 0.65 0.51
2006 0.60 0.47 −0.11 −0.12 0.32 1.45 0.42 −0.10 0.24
2007 −0.07 0.22 −0.15 0.79 0.28 0.31 0.16 0.19 0.53
2008 0.16 −0.01 −0.16 0.20 0.73 0.62 0.74 0.17 −0.27
2009 0.70 0.96 0.02 0.70 0.18 0.69 0.29 0.28 −0.17
2010 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.33 0.26 0.18 1.52 −0.15 0.67
2011 1.05 −0.01 0.29 0.51 0.31 0.76 0.11 0.11 0.34
2012 0.62 0.13 0.55 0.51 0.28 0.31 0.44 0.19 −0.48
2013 0.38 1.62 0.60 0.20 0.02 0.33 0.11 1.05 0.50
Notes: This panel presents bootstrap©-estimated©k-parameters for 10 different commodities. Figures marked in bold indicate
that these estimates are signiﬁcantly different from zero at a 5% level, based on a test on the PWM estimator of©k. Under the
null of k^ ¼ 0, the estimator is asymptotically distributed as N 0; 0:5633ð Þ=nÞ, and the test is performed by comparing the
statistic Z ¼ k ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃn=0:5633ð Þp with the critical values of a standard normal distribution (Hosking et al., 1985). Signiﬁcant
positive values of©Z imply rejection of H0 in favour of k > 0, and signiﬁcant negative values of©Z imply rejection in favour
of k < 0.
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745 bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals gives no evidence
of increasing tail-related risk, with a possible excep-
tion for corn and wheat. An analysis of estimated
shape-parameters of the GEV-distribution further
substantiates that there is no systematic change in
750 the extreme risk associated with commodity invest-
ments. We ﬁnd that the return distributions of a
majority of the commodities we have examined
belong in the Frechét domain of attraction. This
suggests commodity return distributions with heavy
755 tails throughout the period 1995©–2013.
Our ﬁndings do not support the hypothesis of
increasingly extreme commodity market risk. This is
in line with the results©obtained by Gilbert and
Morgan (2010), who use their conclusion to highlight
760 that volatility has been high in the past before reverting
to normal levels. The results in our analysis further cast
doubt on the claim that the substantial growth in index
tracking and speculation during the last 10 years has
generated increased (and excessive) price volatility.
765 Our results support the traditional view that agricultural
price volatility is mainly driven by demand- and sup-
ply©-side shocks, typically caused by adverse weather or
dramatic political decisions and events. This is an
important ﬁnding, because volatility driven by funda-
770 mentals cannot be tamed by regulation. To the contrary,
one needs to look for good ways to manage this risk.
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Commodity Contract speciﬁcations Mnemonic
Corn CBOT Contracts of 5000 bushels CW.CS04
Wheat CBOT Contracts of 5000 bushels CW.CS04
Soybeans CBOT Contracts of 5000 bushels CS.CS04
Soyaoil CBOT Contracts of 60 000 pounds CBOCS04
Lean Hogs CME Contracts of 40 000 pounds CLHCS04
Sugar CSCE No 11, Contracts of 112 000 pounds NSBCS04
Feeder cattle CME Contracts of 50 000 pounds CFDCS04
Cocoa CSCE Contracts of 10 metric tons NCCCS04
Orange juice NYCE Contracts of 15 000 pounds, frozen concentrated NJOCS04
Note: CBOT, Chicago Board of Trade; CME,AQ15 Chicago Mercantile Exchange; NYCE, New
York Commodity Exchange.
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